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A fost scholars agree that members of Congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection. This 
assumption implies that members of Congress adopt institutions, rules, and norms of behavior in part 
1LYE. to serve their electoral interests. Direct tests of the electoral connection are rare, however, because 
significant, exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult o identify. We develop and test an 
electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment "property rights." We examine committee tenure 
patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system-the states' rapid adoption of 
Australian ballot laws in the early 1890s. The ballot changes, we argue, induced new "personal vote" electoral 
incentives, which contributed to the adoption of "modem" congressional institutions uch as property rights to 
committee assignments. We demonstrate a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892, by which time 
a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force, and earlier than previous studies have suggested. 
A common theme in research on congressional in- 
stitutions is that members of Congress adopt 
institutions and rules that serve their desire for 
reelection. Important structural features of the commit- 
tee system, for example, should be explicable in terms of 
their effects on reelection efforts. Often criticized, this 
Mayhewian reelection incentive premise is itself almost 
never put to the test, for the simple reason that signifi- 
cant changes in American electoral institutions have 
been quite rare. 
We shall develop and test an explicit, electoral expla- 
nation for one of the key features of the modern House 
committee system-the norm of reappointing incum- 
bent members of Congress to their same committee 
assignments at the start of each Congress. We argue that 
this so-called property right norm of reappointment 
reflects personalistic reelection incentives arising from 
the single-member district, secret ballot electoral system 
used in U.S. states. 
The states' conversion from party-strip balloting to 
Australian (secret) ballots in the 1890s profoundly al- 
tered the electoral environment faced by incumbent 
members of Congress. The secret ballot allows voters to 
reward or punish each of their elected representatives 
(local, state, and national, all of whom might appear on 
the same ballot) individually. These reforms, we argue, 
made credit-claiming and other personal vote activities 
by members of Congress significantly more important 
for reelection, even at the very height of "strong party 
government" in the United States (Brady 1973). 
The changes in balloting, therefore, were a key pre- 
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cursor to House adoption of a host of "modern" prac- 
tices with important credit-claiming effects, from the 
reappointment norm to the expansion of professional 
staffs. Secure committee tenure allowed incumbent 
members of Congress to develop "careerist" patterns of 
behavior in the House (Price 1977)-including commit- 
tee-related policy expertise-that provided fuel for in- 
creased legislative activity in the decades following the 
Australian ballot reforms. 
We test these claims by examining committee tenure 
patterns for House members during the period between 
Reconstruction and the New Deal. Specifically, we show 
a significant increase in the probability of an individual 
House member retaining his assignments from one 
Congress to the next (about 10% for the typical member 
in our sample) immediately following a flurry of state 
adoptions of Australian ballot laws in the 1889-92 
period.1 This effect shows through even after controlling 
for such other significant influences as turnover in 
House membership and party control and each mem- 
ber's lengths of service in the chamber and on a partic- 
ular committee. 
We shall present the logic of our argument about 
electoral incentives and the structure of the House, then 
suggest and critique two stylized, alternative explana- 
tions for the origins of the seniority system, emphasizing 
their implications for committee tenure. The first, which 
we label the institutionalization hypothesis, emphasizes 
the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910 as a "critical 
moment" in the House's institutional development (Car- 
mines and Stimson 1989). The second, which we call the 
realignment hypothesis, posits the election of 1896 as the 
critical moment that launched a wholesale transforma- 
tion of House membership to "careerist" types from 
"amateur" types. 
Next, we present a statistical model of committee 
tenure that allows us to examine the key, testable 
implication of our story against the stylized alternatives. 
The main testable difference between the models lies in 
the predicted timing of changes in tenure patterns. We 
show that our prediction-a marked increase in the rate 
"Typical" results in nonlinear models such as ours should be 
interpreted with care. We discuss this point further below in the data 
analysis section. 
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at which incumbents retain committee assignments from 
one Congress to the next after 1892-better explains the 
observed data than do the two stylized alternatives. 
ELECTORAL INCENTIVES, BALLOT 
REFORM, AND STANDING 
COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE 
Do members of Congress design congressional institu- 
tions to accommodate their reelection interests? Legis- 
lative scholars have used Mayhew's simplifying assump- 
tion that contemporary members of Congress are 
"single-minded seekers of reelection" to motivate parsi- 
monious, powerful models of how the modern Congress 
works (1974, 5). Of course, members of Congress are 
interested in more than just reelection. Nonetheless, 
more often than not the reelection incentive seems to 
work as a proximal goal, shaping members' behavior. We 
follow Mayhew's lead by maintaining it as our primary 
motivational assumption for incumbent members of 
Congress, even for the nineteenth-century members of 
Congress who are our main focus here. 
We shall outline the theoretical underpinnings of our 
approach to congressional organization and then focus 
in on the key historical events we wish to explain. We 
show that the incentives arising from ballot reforms had 
a clear, independent effect on member of Congress 
preferences over House structures and that the reforms 
helped create the context for the modern, professional- 
ized House. First, we shall discuss the relationship 
between electoral incentives and member of Congress 
preferences about committee assignments. Our basic 
thesis is that while there is a reelection value to commit- 
tee assignments (e.g., opportunities to develop a repu- 
tation as a policy "expert," procurer of pork or influen- 
tial decision maker in a particular policy arena), this 
value will also reflect characteristics of the electoral 
system. We then take an initial look at the empirical 
evidence on committee transfers and ballot law changes. 
LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION, THE 
AUSTRALIAN BALLOT, AND THE 
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 
The conventional wisdom on single nontransferable vote 
elections (of which the plurality district elections used in 
the United States are a special case) dictates that 
incumbents try to build up their "personal reputations" 
in order to hold office. Candidates generally have two 
characteristics with which to seek office: the collective 
reputation of the party to which they belong and their 
own, personal reputation (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 
1987; see also Fenno 1978). Personal reputations refer 
to the attributes of a candidate that voters perceive to be 
particular to that individual, such as how personable, 
competent, or trustworthy he or she is. Collective repu- 
tations refer to the attributes that voters ascribe to all 
candidates bearing a particular party label, such as the 
perception that Democrats, on average, are more sym- 
pathetic to the interests of the poor than are Republi- 
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cans or that Republicans are "tougher" on law-and- 
order issues.2 
A single congressional candidate generally can do very 
little to affect his party's reputation. However, a weak 
collective reputation can in some cases be compensated 
for by a very strong personal one. As Cain, Ferejohn, 
and Fiorina put it, "Visibility is the cornerstone of an 
effective district strategy. Without visibility, representa- 
tives cannot have independent standing in the elector- 
ate's collective mind, and without independent standing 
they cannot anticipate personal success in otherwise 
unfavorable political circumstances" (1987, 27). 
The electoral system itself, however, can limit the 
degree to which a candidate can establish "independent 
standing." For example, in proportional representation 
parliamentary elections, voters generally cast a vote for 
an entire list of party candidates rather than allocating 
votes to individuals within the list. The larger the district 
magnitude, the smaller the role any individual candi- 
date's "personal reputation" will likely play in voters' 
choices between lists.3 An individual member of parlia- 
ment may be only one of several party candidates offered 
from that district. Thus, in a large-district-magnitude, 
closed-list proportional representation system, incum- 
bents should care first and foremost about being ranked 
high on the party list. Logically, this motivation need not 
induce in the incumbent much interest in developing a 
personal reputation with voters. 
The party-printed ballot used in most states' elections 
in the United States for several decades prior to the 
advent of the Australian ballot was similar to the pro- 
portional representation ballot in how it limited the 
relevance of any individual candidate's personal reputa- 
tion for the voter's choice. The voter generally cast only 
a single ballot to weigh in on a number of contests 
(Albright 1942; Evans 1917; Fredman 1968). Hence, 
before the Australian ballot, the process of voting a 
"split" ticket (i.e., a mixture of different parties' candi- 
dates for different offices) was physically difficult. 
The difficulty arose from two primary sources. First, 
the states required ballots to be written or printed. 
Because a large percentage of the potential electorate 
was illiterate in the nineteenth century, this requirement 
limited the ability of many voters to scratch or substitute 
for individual candidates (Kousser 1974). Second, bal- 
lots were generally deposited publicly in the ballot box, 
without the benefit of a private voting booth in which a 
voter could evaluate his choices away from prying eyes. 
Party agents could easily monitor voters to whom they 
had given ballots to make sure that those ballots were 
cast unaltered (Albright 1942). 
A vote in favor of an individual candidate was tanta- 
mount to a vote for the entire partisan ticket. The less 
important the office, the less likely it seems that a voter 
would hinge his ballot choice on the personal character- 
istics of a single candidate. What this meant for the 
2 Petrocik (1991) refers to this as partisan 'issue ownership." 
3 Of course, the personal reputations of candidates who have been 
tabbed by their party as prospective cabinet ministers (especially the 
party's nominee for prime minister) will likely have some effect on 
voting. 
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candidates is obvious: holders of low-ranking offices 
would have almost no electoral incentive to distinguish 
themselves in the eyes of voters. In presidential election 
years especially, the electoral fates of members of Con- 
gress were largely subject to the attractiveness of the top 
of the ticket. As Kernell put it, "The use of party ballots 
produced extremely high levels of straight party voting 
for every office from President down to Registrar of the 
Deeds.... Not until the adoption of the Australian 
ballot throughout the country in the late 1890s did many 
congressmen have much prospect of 'controlling' their 
district" (1977, 672; see also Rusk 1970). 
A system that commingles a member of Congress's 
reelection efforts with those of his party's candidates for 
other offices sets up a collective action problem for 
members of a party ticket. Conceptually, each candidate 
on a ticket wants the others to do the hard work of 
attracting voters to the party slate. Without a solution to 
this collective dilemma, we might expect most candi- 
dates to shirk-to fail to put into the reelection cam- 
paign the kind of effort that we have come to expect 
from modern legislative candidates. 
It appears instead that in the postbellum period 
candidates for various offices solved their collective 
dilemma by leaving electioneering to local party organi- 
zations and reputation building to the head of the ticket 
(see, e.g., Mayer 1967; Morgan 1969). As a result, the 
ticket's "collective reputation" was closely identified 
with the "personal reputations" and policy platforms of 
its top candidates and of the local machine. The private 
reputations of many candidates on a ticket probably 
were quite weak and the marginal impact of lower-office 
candidates on voters' choices, controlling for these first 
two effects, was probably nil.4 
The Australian ballot system personalized elections by 
allowing voters to cast their votes office-by-office instead 
of forcing them to use a party ticket. Whereas members 
of Congress formerly would rationally have undersup- 
plied patterned credit-claiming and position-taking ac- 
tivities in the House, they now would want to define and 
expand their personal reputations with voters. Reelec- 
tion-seeking members thenceforth had incentives to 
blow their own credit-claiming horns as often as possi- 
ble. 
This is our argument in a nutshell: The ballot changes 
raised the interest of members of Congress in institu- 
tional arrangements that would help them build per- 
sonal reputations. Stable committee assignments give 
members the leeway and confidence they need to be- 
come policy experts within their committees' jurisdic- 
tions. Policy experts are better equipped to claim credit 
and are more noteworthy position takers on policies 
within their committee's jurisdictions than are randomly 
selected members of Congress. Hence, a "norm" of 
reappointing incumbents to their same committees 
would be consistent with a widespread desire for build- 
ing personal reputations. 
Instituting this norm, however, would require the com- 
pliance of House agents responsible for making commit- 
4Aldrich (1995) provides a more in-depth discussion of the pre- 
Australian ballot collective action problems that we discuss here. 
tee assignments. Prior to the revolt against Speaker 
Joseph Cannon (R-IL) in 1910, this authority resided in 
the speakership (since then they have de facto been 
chosen by party caucus committees; see Alexander 1916; 
Cox and McCubbins 1993; McConachie 1973). Given 
that the ballot reforms were adopted at the state level at 
different times and not imposed on all states simulta- 
neously, when should the Speaker have reacted to this 
hypothesized change in member preferences over as- 
signment patterns? 
We assume that the Speaker was a responsive agent of 
the majority caucus and that his goal in making assign- 
ments would have been to maximize his party's proba- 
bility of retaining its majority in the next election. When 
incumbent member of Congress's personal reputations 
do not significantly affect their reelection chances, all 
that matters to the Speaker in assignment decisions 
would be each member of Congress's marginal contri- 
bution in different committees. Depending on the juris- 
dictions of the differing committees and the relative 
salience of various issues to the electorate, the impor- 
tance of individual committees to the party's overall 
reelection effort could rise and fall over time. Hence, the 
Speaker would have incentives to move his most produc- 
tive members where they could have the greatest mar- 
ginal effect-and to move slackers and disloyal members 
to where they would do the least damage.5 
When personal reputations are important to reelec- 
tion, however, the Speaker would want to take that fact 
into account. This implies that the Speaker may have 
treated members of Congress differently as their respec- 
tive states adopted Australian ballot laws. There are two 
problems with this supposition, however. 
First, committee assignments for members in a given 
Congress are not independent of one another, although 
we effectively treat them as such in our empirical model. 
We can think of the Speaker's prereform task as trying 
to maximize the net positive electoral externalities being 
generated by the various standing committees for ma- 
jority party members seeking reelection. In other words, 
he wants to compose the committees so that the system 
best helps all members win reelection. But with the 
reforms, he must also worry about how transfers will 
affect the reelection chances of individual members of 
Congress. These constraints create a tension between 
the positive externalities that might arise from making a 
transfer and the potentially negative particular effects on 
the transferred member. Removing certain members of 
Congress from the pool of potential transferees would 
have a general effect on how well the Speaker could 
accomplish the goal of maximizing the positive effects of 
5This reasoning would seem to apply in reverse to the minority party's 
assignments. In other words, the Speaker would seem to have had 
incentives to minimize the contributions of minority party members of 
Congress to their party's probability of seizing control of the chamber. 
Historically, however, it seems that the minority party's leadership 
strongly influenced the actual assignments received by its members. 
Wholesale discrimination against minority members in the assignment 
process probably would have generated a strong response from the 
minority in the form of dilatory tactics on the floor and in committee, 
with negative net consequences. 
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the system, so we cannot simply analyze members of 
Congress from early-adoption states separately. 
Second, as we shall discuss in the next subsection, the 
ballot reform movement swept very rapidly through the 
United States in the 1889-92 period. So many states 
adopted the new balloting procedures in such a short 
period of time that attempting to separate out the 
individual state effects on the assignment process would 
not likely be very informative. Further, as we shall 
discuss, the cluster of states adopting in the early period 
accounted for majorities of both parties. Since the 
Speaker is in effect the elected leader of his party, we 
would expect such a large change in his party constitu- 
ency to affect critically his decision making on key 
institutional issues, such as committee assignments. 
ELECTORAL REFORMS AND 
COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS 
IN THE POSTBELLUM ERA 
We have argued that the modern electoral connection 
between individual candidates and the voters hinges on 
the structure of the electoral system. Voters consider 
both an incumbent's personal characteristics and the 
collective characteristics of the coalitions with which 
their- member is aligned (i.e., party affiliation), but the 
weights voters attach to these separate components are 
at least partially determined by how votes are cast and 
aggregated. Hence, a system that allows voters to eval- 
uate and vote for candidates on an office-by-office, 
case-by-case basis encourages incumbents to invest more 
in their personal reputations than when voters cannot 
discriminate between individual candidates on a partisan 
slate. 
We shall provide some initial, empirical support for 
our focus on ballot reforms and the early 1890s as the 
critical period for the rise of "modern" congressional 
practices. This approach does not deny that the secret 
ballot had other effects as well. Probably the most 
important of these was its depression of turnout. 
Kousser (1974) noted that the official, secret ballot 
constituted a de facto literacy test, which effectively 
barred many thousands of potential voters (North and 
South) from exercising their franchise. He shows that 
this effect was known to many of the supporters of secret 
ballot legislation and argues that depressing the turnout 
of certain classes of voters was in fact the goal of many 
ballot "reformers" in the states.6 The disfranchising 
effects of the secret ballot may have had important 
effects on the policy agendas pursued by incumbent 
legislators (by eliminating blocs of potentially like- 
minded voters), but we see no reason to believe that they 
significantly detracted from the personal-vote incentives 
of the ballot reforms. 
The electoral incentive explanation we offer for 
changing patterns of member of Congress behavior does 
6 In addition to the turnout effect cited by Kousser, Rusk (1970) 
showed that the form of the secret ballot also affected voting. The 
Massachusetts office-bloc format proved to be significantly more 
amenable to "independent" (i.e., split-ticket) voting than was the 
Indiana party-column format. 
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FIGURE 1. Percent of Committee 
Assignments Retained, by Year 
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 
not directly imply that the Speaker should change the 
way he makes committee assignments or that party 
caucuses should become more active (or, for that matter, 
less active). Instead, for our purposes here, we have 
assumed that party leaders tend to be good, responsive 
agents for their party caucuses. But even if the leaders 
were of a more recalcitrant type, the rules also specified 
that the House could elect committee members by ballot 
in lieu of appointment by the Speaker. 
Party leaders' assignment authority has thus always 
been constrained, at least in principle. Before 1911, the 
Speaker was constrained both ex ante by the promises he 
had made vis-a-vis committees in order to win the post 
and ex post by the threat of revolt against specific 
assignments (Follett 1896; Stewart 1992a). Since 1911, 
the party caucuses or caucus committees have faced the 
same threat of revolt on the floor by ad hoc majorities 
opposed to their proposed slates. Any change in elec- 
toral incentives that affected a large majority of House 
members, therefore, could have induced a change in 
assignment practices. 
Empirically it is easy to demonstrate that a major 
increase in the rate of reappointment (of incumbents to 
their same committees) took place in the 1890s. Figure 1 
shows this aggregate effect; it plots the percentage of 
committee assignments held in House t that were re- 
tained by the same members in House t + 1.7 The figure 
shows a sharp, decade-long climb in the percentage of 
assignments retained beginning in about 1892, followed 
by a relatively stable period during the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Fewer than half of all assignments 
held by returning members were retained by those 
members in the next House during 1877-90, whereas 
nearly three-quarters were retained by incumbents be- 
tween 1896 and 1910. 
A total of 32 states had installed secret, official ballot 
laws in time for the presidential election of 1892 (Evans 
1917, 27; Ludington 1911). Seven more states adopted 
secret ballot measures prior to the 1896 presidential 
election. Table 1 details the dates when each state 
7 The graph implicitly controls for turnover, because only committee 
assignments held by returning members are considered. 
American Political Science Review Vol. 90, No. 1 
TABLE 1. State Adoption of Australian 
Ballot Laws 
Year Year 
State Adopted State Adopted 
Elections Prior to 1892 
(235 seats in 1892) 
AR 1891 MT 1889 
DE 1891 NH 1891 
IN 1889 OR 1891 
ME 1891 SD 1891 
Ml 1891 WA 1890 
MO 1889 WY 1891 
NV 1891 CO 1891 
OH 1891 IL 1891 
RI 1889 KY 1892 
VT 1890 MA 1888 
WI 1889 MS 1890 
CA 1891 NE 1891 
ID 1891 ND 1891 
IA 1892 PA 1891 
MD 1890 TN 1891 
MN 1889 WV 1891 
During 1893-96 
(69 Seats, 1892) 
AL 1893 NY 1895 
LA 1896a KS 1893 
FL 1895a VA 1894 
After 1896 
(39 Seats, 1892) 
AZ 191 NC after 1910 
NJ after 1910 SC after 191 Oa 
OK 1908b GA after 1910 
UT 1896b NM after 1910 
CT 1909a TX 1905 
Sources: Ludington 1911 and U.S. Dept. of Commerce. 
Note: For more detail on the laws adopted by the various states, see 
Ludington 191 1. Alaska and Hawaii were not admitted to the Union until 
after the end of our study period. 
aState adopted a multibox ballot law prior to 1892 (CT, FL, LA, NC, and 
SC). 
bState admitted to the union after 1892 (AZ, NM, OK, and UT). In each 
case, an Australian ballot law was originally adopted by the territorial 
legislature and reaffirmed after statehood. The table notes the date of 
reaffirmation or of admission to statehood. 
adopted the secret ballot and the size of each state's 
House contingent after the apportionment of 1890. As 
the table shows, the 32 early-adoption states accounted 
for nearly two-thirds of House membership in the Fifty- 
Third Congress (elected 1892), and most of those states 
adopted their laws during 1891 or 1892.8 
8 Evans attributed the flurry of ballot-law activity in 1889-92 to a 
reformist reaction to "the unprecedented use of money in the election 
of 1888" (1917, 27). Progressive reformers argued that the secret ballot 
would enhance the "independence" of candidates from the machines 
by reducing the participation of low-information voters (who were 
presumed to be manipulable). We prefer Kousser's argument that the 
secret ballot's turnout-depressing effects served the political interests 
of certain party elites (Southern Democrats in his case-to which we 
would add Northern Republicans). The most important case of delays 
in adopting a secret ballot law was that of New York, where Demo- 
cratic Governor David Hill vetoed Republican-supported Australian 
ballot bills in 1888 and 1889 (Evans 1917, 20). A further partisan 
motivation for the official ballot lied in its regulation of entry to the 
ballot. Official ballot laws typically incorporated some specification of 
the requirements for nomination, such as a number of signatures on a 
The Australian ballot affected majorities in both par- 
ties right from the start. Out of 218 Democrats in the 
Fifty-Third House, 121 (55%) hailed from early-adop- 
tion states. On the Republican side, 109 of 127 came 
from early adopters. Nor was the ballot movement 
merely regional. Southern and border states with Aus- 
tralian ballot laws in place by 1892 accounted for 54 
Democrats in the Fifty-Third. Several of the heavily 
contested northern and border states were also in the 
mix. Illinois sent 11 Democrats to the Fifty-Third House, 
against 11 Republicans; Indiana, 11 against 2; Kentucky, 
10 against 1; Missouri, 14 against 1; Ohio, 11 against 10; 
Pennsylvania, 10 against 20. These same states in the 
1894 midterm Republican landslide victory sent a total 
of only 13 Democrats to the Fifty-Fourth House (includ- 
ing zero from Illinois and Indiana), against 103 Repub- 
licans (for partisan affiliations of members of these 
Congresses, see Martis 1989). 
The distribution of ballot law changes, therefore, was 
both widespread enough and balanced enough to sup- 
port our claim that attentive Speakers should have 
responded positively to the new electoral incentives they 
induced in incumbent members. The ballot movement 
was no hare-brained, western populist scheme that could 
be ignored or marginalized by more sophisticated east- 
ern party leaders. On the contrary, it had captured most 
of the crucial "swing" states, such as Indiana, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania; and it had affected the election of major- 
ities of both parties' memberships. Neither party could 
afford to ignore the ballot's-effects if it were to challenge 
for national power. 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND 
REALIGNMENT: ALTERNATIVE 
EXPLANATIONS FOR HOUSE 
"MODERNIZATION" 
As we have noted, the literature on the House's histor- 
ical development provides two rival explanations of its 
"modernization." Neither of these directly addresses the 
committee tenure question, although both approaches, 
we argue, imply the rise of something like a property 
right in committee membership. We shall present highly 
stylized interpretations of those explanations as applied 
to committee tenure patterns. The first such explanation 
we call the institutionalization hypothesis (after Abram 
and Cooper 1968; Polsby 1968; Polsby, Gallaher, and 
Rundquist 1969), as we see its explanation for tenure 
rights arising out of a general process of institutional 
maturation. The second arises primarily from several 
papers by Price (1971, 1975, 1977). We labeled this 
approach the realignment hypothesis, as Price says the 
realignment of 1896 was causally important for the 
timing of "professionalization" in the House. 
House modernization for the institutionalization au- 
petition. Pennsylvania, for example, required as many as 3,000 signa- 
tures to get a candidate on the ballot in Philadelphia County. 
California required more than 12,000 signatures to nominate a candi- 
date for statewide office (Fredman 1968, 48). These stiff nominating 
requirements gave the more established organizations a distinct ad- 
vantage-and encouraged wayward factions back into the organiza- 
tional fold (or at least into fusion arrangements) in some cases. 
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thors was a long-term process of institutional matura- 
tion. In this view, Congress changed very gradually over 
the post-Reconstruction and early Progressive periods 
from an organization with high membership turnover 
and ill-defined and unstable internal (chamber) rules 
and roles to one with slow turnover and clear rules and 
roles for its career-oriented members. In the premodern 
House, party leadership cliques ruled. But in the mod- 
ern, institutionalized House, power devolved from party 
leaders through the decentralized, standing committee 
system to the members themselves. 
This devolution of power implied a demand for com- 
mittee tenure property rights for, as Orfield put it, "slow 
turnover of members causes Congress to be dominated 
by members with a vested interest in the organizational 
status quo" (quoted in Brady 1980, 178). Institutional- 
ization, therefore, ran contrary to the interests of party 
politicians and to the maintenance of "responsible" 
party government. For the institutionalists, it led ulti- 
mately to the replacement of the "czarist" Reed-Can- 
non, "strong Speaker," party-oriented House with the 
textbook "committee government" mode of politics fa- 
miliar to most students of American politics. 
The question for institutionalists (and for testing their 
claim vis-a-vis tenure patterns) is what form the transi- 
tion should have taken. One simple supposition would 
be to expect committee tenure probabilities to increase 
incrementally (i.e., gradually and steadily over the tran- 
sitional period). What counts as "incremental" is largely 
in the eye of the beholder, however, and therefore is 
difficult to falsify. 
In order to identify a clear, testable hypothesis for this 
approach, we take advantage of the fact that the insti- 
tutionalists place considerable emphasis on the revolt 
against Speaker Cannon in 1910-11 as "the single most 
important watershed in the history of the House and [an 
event] of crucial significance for an understanding of the 
modern House" (Abram and Cooper 1968, 54; see also 
Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1979; Fiorina 1977; Galloway 
and Wise 1976; Goodwin 1959, 1970; for an alternative 
view, see Jones 1968). We make use of this linkage 
between the institutionalization view and analyses of the 
revolt against Cannon to suggest a stylized reinterpreta- 
tion of the institutionalization thesis.9 
Polsby (and others) argued that the structure of the 
House changed critically following the revolt-from a 
world in which committee assignments reflected the 
discretionary authority of the Speaker to one in which 
"committees have won solid institutionalized indepen- 
dence from party leaders both inside and outside Con- 
gress" (Polsby 1968, 156).10 The institutionalization ap- 
9 Price ascribes this explanation to Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, as 
well (Price 1971, 17). 
10 As Polsby puts it, "In part, it was Speaker Cannon's increasing use 
of [his appointment power] in an attempt to keep control of his 
fragmenting party that triggered the revolt ... and that led to the 
establishment of the committee system as we know it today" (1968, 
156). Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist themselves focus on whether or 
not would-be committee chairs whose seniority was violated received 
"compensation." They convincingly show that "uncompensated" vio- 
lations on chair appointments all but disappear after the Cannon 
revolt. From this they infer the broader point about the installation of 
an "automatic" seniority system. 
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proach to seniority, therefore, asserts that there are 
long-term effects at play but that the observable data 
should reflect the cataclysmic effects of the Cannon 
Revolt. The revolt against Cannon was in this view a 
"critical moment" in the institutional history of the 
House (Carmines and Stimson 1989). In our interpreta- 
tion, the institutionalization thesis thus identifies causal 
factors both internal (gains from specialization and 
universalistic application of rules) and external (changes 
in turnover) that lead to the critical moment of the 
revolt, which we stylize as an internal, proximal cause of 
the changes in tenure patterns. 
Price's critique of Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist's 
model of seniority argued that it was misspecified be- 
cause it failed to account directly for membership turn- 
over (and changes in majority party control of the 
House). We agree with these criticisms. We are less 
interested in his critique of Polsby, Gallaher, and 
Rundquist than we are in his explanation for the change, 
however. Our stylization of Price's realignment ap- 
proach suggests that the timing of seniority (both tenure 
rights and promotion practices) as a "system" substan- 
tially predated the Republican factional disputes that 
culminated in the revolt. The key to the seniority system 
in Price's (1971) view was a cultural change in the 
House's membership. This change, in his view, did not 
require a cataclysmic internal event, such as the revolt, to 
trigger its manifestation in the institutional roles of 
members of Congress. Professionalized members sought 
and received stable committee assignments. 
The source of the seniority system was a critical 
change in House membership from mostly "amateurs" 
to mostly "professionals." That changeover, Price ar- 
gued, was signaled "above all by the collapse of the 
Democrats in the 1896 Bryan campaign" (1971, 9). The 
Democrats' collapse triggered a tremendous increase 
in incumbent Republicans' desire to stay in the House, 
such that "from 1896 on, career patterns and expecta- 
tions had undergone basic structural change" (pp. 17- 
18). This formulation, again, suggests a "critical mo- 
ment" in the House's institutional history, this time 
driven more by external factors than internal ones. 
To be sure, there are many nuanced and sophisticated 
treatments of realignment in the literature that do not 
insist on the 1896 election as the critical date (e.g., the 
essays in Campbell and Trilling 1980). It is not our goal 
here to determine whether or not the 1896 election was 
realigning.1 Indeed, we largely agree with Price's theo- 
retical points that member of Congress goals and desires 
drive House organization and therefore that we should 
look first to external causal mechanisms to explain impor- 
tant changes in House organizational patterns. Rather, 
it is our goal to extend and clarify Price's theoretical 
speculations on professionalism in the House by propos- 
ing a simple behavioral model that better predicts the 
timing of the shift toward professionalization. 
We are not the first to critique the behavioral impli- 
cations of the mid-1890s realignment. Indeed, Polsby's 
11 On this question, Nardulli (1995) presents convincing support for 
1896 as a "critical moment" in presidential elections, based on an 
extensive analysis of local election returns. 
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own work includes one effort to reject the supposed 
realignment as a causal factor in the 1910 revolt against 
Speaker Cannon (Budgor et al. 1981). Some scholars go 
so far as to reject the realignment label altogether for 
the 1890s, at least as far as observable behaviors in 
Congress are concerned (see, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 
1993). On the other hand, Brady (1980) employs com- 
parisons between committee assignments in the Fifty- 
Fifth House (elected 1896) and the preceding Fifty- 
Fourth (1894) and Fifty-Third (1892) Houses to argue 
in favor of 1896 as a realigning election.12 There appears 
to be sufficient scholarly weight in favor of the 1896 date 
to justify our stylization for the purposes of providing a 
clear alternative hypothesis to our own explanation of 
changes in committee tenure patterns. 
We shall now examine more closely the empirical 
evidence on committee tenure patterns by modeling and 
testing these two alternative hypotheses about the timing 
of the adoption of a seniority norm, against our hypoth- 
esis, extending the Price and Polsby-Gallaher-Rundquist 
analyses of committee leadership selection to consider 
tenure probabilities for all incumbent members of Con- 
gress. We argue that our hypothesis, grounded as it is in 
a change in electoral incentives, better explains the data 
and further points the way to a new explanation of other 
changes in House Rules left unexplained or accounted 
for in an ad hoc fashion by the Price and Polsby- 
Gallaher-Rundquist models. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The central empirical implication of our approach is that 
committee tenure should rise after the widespread adop- 
tion of the Australian ballot. In order to test this claim, 
we need to build a statistical model of the length of time 
a member stays on a given committee assignment and 
see if there is a significant change after the ballot 
reforms. In particular, we predict a significant upward 
shift in committee tenure as personal vote opportunities 
become more worthwhile to the member. 
There are three general characteristics of the commit- 
tee tenure data that make it somewhat difficult to model, 
however. First, we note that it is integer-valued-that is, 
our data set is coded in such a way that a member serves 
one term, two terms, and so on. Thus, a model that 
predicted a stay on a committee of, say, 1.7 terms would 
imply that we know more about tenure than we in fact 
know. The second characteristic of the data is that we 
expect it to display "duration dependence." If our 
expectations about committee tenure are correct, then 
each additional term on a given committee represents an 
investment in the member of Congress's personal brand 
12 Brady presents membership turnover on 13 House committees in 
1896 as supporting evidence for that election as realigning. In every 
case, turnover in the Fifty-Fifth Congress compared to membership in 
the Fifty-Fourth exceeded 50% and reached 100% for 10 of the 26 
party-contingents on the 13 committees. In contrast, turnover in the 
Fifty-Third Congress averaged just over 30%. Because Brady wanted 
to present evidence relating to the validity of 1896 as a realigning 
election, he did not restrict his analysis to only returning members of 
Congress. Hence, his results commingle members transferred from 
committee to committee with members of Congress not reelected. 
name. Over time, the member will be less interested in 
transferring away from a given assignment, all else equal, 
because giving up an assignment means he would lose 
the accumulated investment. Thus, a member who has 
been on a committee for five terms should be less likely 
to give up his assignment than would a freshman mem- 
ber, all else equal. In effect, we would like our model to 
weight the other determinants of committee exit by a 
member's length of prior service on the committee. 
The last problem modeling the data is that the ob- 
served data are censored: as noted, our data set only 
includes surviving members. We do not get to observe 
the counterfactual-what would have happened to com- 
mittee assignments had another incumbent retained his 
seat, rather than getting booted out of office. It is well 
known that House turnover rates declined significantly 
during the late nineteenth century (Fiorina, Rohde, and 
Wissel 1975). This potentially introduces a time-depen- 
dency problem as well. Later-elected members of Con- 
gress are more likely to win reelection; turnover per se 
probably affects the stability of committee assignments. 
While this turnover effect is important (as was pointed 
out by Price), it does not speak to the question we wish 
to answer: Does individual member of Congress behav- 
ior change after ballot reforms? 
One approach to this problem could have been to 
focus on panel data, that is, to follow a "class" elected in 
a particular year throughout its members' lives. This was 
the approach used by Budgor and his colleagues (1981) 
to argue that the realignment of 1896 was not a signifi- 
cant cause of the revolt against Cannon in 1910. How- 
ever, focusing on only a single "class" at a time would 
prevent us from making full use of the information 
available in the committee assignment data. What we 
would really like to do, in effect, is to incorporate 
observations on all of the respective "classes" that are 
present in a given House into a single model. 
The class of models used to solve these three prob- 
lems (referred to as duration models) is widely applied in 
labor economics to study employment patterns (for a 
general review, see Kiefer 1988). The primary choice we 
must make is whether to model the distribution of 
durations directly (as is suggested in King et al. 1990) 
using some discrete distribution or, instead, to model the 
conditional probabilities of leaving a committee at the 
end of a term. Such conditional probabilities are re- 
ferred to as "hazard rates" in the duration literature. 
Both the distribution of durations and the hazard rate 
contain the same information (as is shown in the appen- 
dix), so we must make this modeling choice based on 
other criteria. King and his colleagues might argue that 
because our predictions are about average durations, we 
should model the central tendency in durations directly, 
for example, E(Yi) = exp(Xip). 
By doing so, however, we would sacrifice the ability 
easily to include time-varying covariates. King and his 
colleagues' goal in modeling cabinet durations was to 
determine what ex ante factors lead governments to last, 
such as investiture rules. Hence, excluding time-varying 
covariates was not a problem. In our case, however, 
time-varying covariates are particularly important be- 
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cause the hypothesis we wish to test is whether or not 
tenure patterns changed after a particular date. We also 
need to account explicitly for such things as turnover in 
congressional membership, which affects all the return- 
ing members of that Congress. Finally, we lose little in 
the way of intuition by using the hazard rate. Our 
prediction in terms of hazard rates is that after the ballot 
reforms, the conditional probability of a member giving 
up an assignment decreases (he becomes less likely to 
transfer off the committee, all else constant). This is 
equivalent to assuming that the expected length of 
tenure increases after the ballot reforms. 
Thus we need to build a model similar to more 
common binary choice models (e.g., logit or probit) in 
which we want to infer an underlying probability for a 
series of binary outcomes: Either the member did or did 
not give up his assignment in a given term on a commit- 
tee (ignoring for the moment any problems due to 
censoring). As with other binary choice problems, a 
linear model generally does not work well because the 
probabilities must lie between zero and one. We there- 
fore adopt a proportional hazard model commonly used 
to model duration data to test our claims.13 The basic 
model is 
X(t, X, 3) = Xo(t)exp(Xt x), (1) 
where XQ, X, 13) is the probability of leaving a committee 
in committee-term-of-service t, given that the member 
has been on the committee for all terms prior to t and 
given a set of covariates Xt (that can change for each 
period of observation of a member of Congress on a 
committee) and parameters 13; and X0(t) is the "base- 
line" probability of leaving a committee when all covari- 
ates are zero, so that exp(Q) is one.14 
We want to ask, Does this hazard rate as modeled in 
equation 1 decline after the reforms? We test this by 
including in Xt a dummy variable, Reform, which indi- 
cates whether a Congress was before or after the cut 
point we have identified as signaling the general adop- 
tion of Australian ballot.15 Our test then boils down to 
asking: Is the coefficient ,1 on the variable Refornm 
significantly negative? If ,1 were negative then exp(Re- 
forn x 13) would be less than one, so that the proba- 
bility after the reform would be some fraction of the 
13 We do not use a logit or probit, because these, while satisfying the 
constraint of producing probabilities, imply a rather odd duration 
dependence. For details of the difference between the logit, probit, and 
other duration models, see Sueyoshi 1991. 
14 The baseline hazard rates XO(t) can be modeled in a number of ways. 
We essentially model it as a term-specific dummy variable-referred to 
as a semiparametric duration model. Alternatives include parametric 
restrictions, which lead naturally to the Gompertz or Weibull distri- 
butions common in the duration literature. We tested these possible 
restrictions via a likelihood ratio test and rejected them. However, 
even under these restrictions, our qualitative results did not change. 
15 Note that for a member who is on a committee both before and after 
the reforms, this dummy variable changes from a zero to a one for all 
committee terms that occur after the reforms. Hence, the model says 
that ceteris paribus, this member would be more/less likely to give up 
the same assignment after the reforms. Hence, we do not have to 
partition the data set into individuals who entered before and after the 
reforms. We allow for members who bridge the reforms to change 
their behavior. 
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baseline probability. This is true regardless of the initial 
value of the baseline hazard for a given term. 
This analysis is contingent on the assumption that the 
only relevant change affecting the hazard rate is ballot 
reform. But the alternative hypotheses suggest other- 
wise. Thus we want also to test the institutionalization 
and realignment hypotheses that there should be 
changes in the hazard rate after the Cannon revolt of 
1910 or after the reelection of 1896, respectively. We 
therefore augmented equation 1 to include a dummy 
variable equal to one for all post-1896 Congresses and a 
dummy variable equal to one for all post-1911 Con- 
gresses, similar to the reform variable already in the 
model. Again, according to both of these alternative 
theories, the coefficients on these dummy variables 
should be negative, indicating a decline in the probabil- 
ity a member gives up an assignment. 
We also need to control for other factors that should 
systematically alter the hazard rate. Recall that our goal 
essentially is to combine Budgor and his colleagues' 
"cohort" or "class" approach with a duration model- 
that is, we want to plug into the equation the relevant 
information about congressional classes, even though 
our duration data are organized by "spells" of commit- 
tee service and the hazard function is written to talk 
about spells. Drawing on Price's critique of Polsby, 
Gallaher, and Rundquist, we included a control for 
turnover. Turnover in our model represents the oppor- 
tunities a member has to change a committee assign- 
ment, because the fewer returning members there are, 
the more committee slots there are to be filled. A similar 
logic also requires us to include a dummy variable for 
change in partisan control of the House, because chang- 
ing party control leads also to changes in the committee 
ratios between parties. This gives members of the new 
majority party possible assignment opportunities above 
and beyond the effects of turnover. Given this logic, both 
increased turnover and a change in partisan control 
should increase the likelihood that a member gives up 
his assignment. 
Decreasing turnover may have other effects that are 
not picked up by the simple turnover variable. Lower 
chamber turnover, of course, implies longer average 
careers in the House, which may have its own effect on 
committee assignments. To account for this possibility, 
we also included a control variable for seniority in the 
House-the cumulative terms served by member i as of 
time t. We expected, consistent with Price's interpreta- 
tion, that as members settle into careers in the House, 
they become less likely to change their committee 
assignments, all else constant. Thus we expect the sign 
on this variable to be negative: higher service in the 
House leads to a lower probability of losing a given 
assignment. 
We also include a dummy variable indicating whether 
the committee assignment is to one of three privileged 
committees: Appropriations, Rules, or Ways and Means. 
This draws on the work that shows that some committees 
are more desirable than others (Munger 1988; Stewart 
1992b). If there are in fact "more desirable" committee 
assignments, for whatever reason, members should 
loathe giving them up. We lack a good theoretical model 
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for distinguishing what these desirable committees 
might be, but a defensible approximation should be to 
distinguish those committees that are defined by the 
House rules to have privileged access to the floor.16 
Finally, we included a control for party membership. We 
had no particular expectation for the effect this variable 
would have, but we note that committee assignments are 
handled at the level of the party caucus, so that there 
might be systematic, idiosyncratic differences in tenure 
patterns between the two parties that our model cannot 
otherwise pick up. The variable, Democrat, is coded as 
one if the member is a Democrat and zero otherwise. 
We estimate this fully specified model using data for 
all standing committee assignments excluding third- 
party members from 1874 to 1928.17 The unit of obser- 
vation is member/committee assignment/committee 
term. So a member who is on two committees for three 
terms per committee contributes a total of six observa- 
tions to the estimation. Hence, in our data set there are 
only 3,411 individual members of Congress but a total of 
20,007 observations. This may seem confusing at first, 
but recall that the model is really estimating the condi- 
tional probability that a member leaves a committee 
assignment in a given term of committee service (i.e., 
conditional on having served some previous number of 
terms on the committee). So multiple observations of a 
member on a committee give new information: The 
member's first year gives us information about the 
probability that a member in his first term will give up an 
assignment, the observation of his second term on the 
committee gives us information about his giving up a 
committee assignment after two terms, and so on.'8 Also 
note that we have progressively less information about 
the latter terms as members either leave Congress or 
give up their committee assignment. We have 11,555 
observations of members in their first term of committee 
service (57.8% of the sample), 4,141 in their second term 
(20.7%), 1,958 in their third term (9.8%), 1,062 in their 
fourth term (5.3%), 576 in their fifth term (2.9%), 344 in 
their sixth term (1.7%), 182 in their seventh term (.9%), 
98 in their eighth term (.5%), and only 59 in their ninth 
term of committee service (.3%). We should therefore 
be cautious of the inferences we draw about behavior of 
16 These three substantive committees enjoyed privileged status 
throughout our study period. A number of other committees (which we 
did not code as "privileged") also enjoyed a measure of floor privileges 
off and on during the postbellum period, including the committees on 
Elections, Public Lands, Rivers and Harbors, Territories, Enrolled 
Bills, Invalid Pensions, Printing, Accounts, and the various committees 
with appropriations duties in addition to the Appropriations Commit- 
tee itself. 
17 Data on committee assignments were originally collected by Garri- 
son Nelson. The data were checked and then merged with the ICPSR 
Congressional Biography database in order to find out a member's 
party, cumulative terms in the House, and whether the member 
returned in the following Congress (i.e., Was the observation cen- 
sored?). 
18 We are in fact ignoring some information in the sample. Because we 
get to observe many of our members multiple times we could in theory 
estimate individually based random effects (i.e., the most extreme form 
of heterogeneity). However, in practice these updated estimates are 
problematic and can lead to mistaken inferences (Heckman and Singer 
1984). 
TABLE 2. Semiparametric Proportional 
Hazard Model of Committee Tenure, 
1874-1928 
Explanatory Variable Parameter 
Cumulative terms in house -.017 
(.005) 
Percent returned .208 
(.136) 
Change in party control .080 
(.028) 
Democrat .081 
(.018) 
Privileged committee -.246 
(.023) 
Realignment .053 
(.043) 
Revolt -.028 
(.023) 
Australian ballot reform -.280 
(.035) 
Baseline integrated hazards 
1 st committee term .081 
(.030) 
2d committee term .258 
(.033) 
3d committee term .355 
(.040) 
4th committee term .509 
(.050) 
5th committee term .501 
(.064) 
6th committee term .359 
(.077) 
7th committee term .324 
(.102) 
8th committee term .810 
(.168) 
9th committee term .547 
(.188) 
Note: Entries are maximum likelihood estimates. Asymptotic standard 
errors appear in parentheses. N = 20007. Log likelihood = -10389.737. 
these very senior members. The details of the estimation 
are discussed in the appendix. 
The results are found in Table 2. Our primary concern 
is the ballot reform dummy. As expected, it is significant 
and negative-evidence in support of our model. The 
results for realignment and the Cannon revolt are less 
impressive. The coefficient on the realignment dummy 
was positive, contrary to the realignment hypothesis, 
although the result was not statistically significant. The 
institutionalization hypothesis fared a little better, in 
that the sign of the revolt coefficient is in the correct 
direction. However, it too is statistically indistinguish- 
able from zero. 
While the results of these statistical hypothesis tests 
provide important support for our main hypothesis, it is 
hard, given the nonlinear form of the model, to see the 
effect of the ballot reform on the probability of giving up 
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TABLE 3. Probability of Giving up Committee 
Assignment 
Committee Before Ballot After Ballot 
Term Reform Reform 
1 st .662 .559 
2d .726 .624 
3d .760 .660 
4th .811 .716 
5th .808 .713 
6th .761 .661 
7th .749 .648 
8th .894 .817 
9th .822 .729 
Note: Probabilities are calculated by holding all covariates at their mean. 
a given committee assignment. In order better to explore 
this effect, in Table 1 we calculated for a hypothetical 
member the probability that he gives up his assignment, 
both before and after the ballot reforms. Our hypothet- 
ical member of Congress has attributes set to their mean 
levels (all continuous covariates are measured as differ- 
ences from mean, so they are zero when the mean value 
is attained) and all dummy variables are set to zero. In 
other words, this member of Congress would be a 
Republican member of a nonprivileged committee in a 
term that saw no change in party control of the chamber 
and whose chamber service was at the mean for the 
1874-1928 period. From Table 3 we see that after the 
reforms our "typical" member about to begin his second 
term on a committee was almost 10% less likely to give 
up that assignment in the next Congress than he would 
have been before the ballot changes. A similar pattern 
holds for the other terms after the ballot reforms.19 
CONCLUSION 
In The Personal Vote, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina wrote 
that "to understand legislative policy making, one must 
understand the electoral relationship between represen- 
tatives and their constituents.... The nature of voter 
response is a critical variable, and voter response is a 
variable, not something etched in stone at the inception 
of a political system" (1987, 212). Students of Congress 
have long noted differences between the way things used 
to be in the responsible party government days of yore in 
the House, on the one hand, and the personalistic, "Why 
don't we do it on the floor" House of recent years. Few 
19 The careful reader will note that the hazard rates in Table 2 actually 
increase somewhat in committee terms 8 and 9, contrary to our 
(implicit) hypothesis of negative duration dependence, which follows 
from an "expertise-driven" explanation of lengthening tenure. As we 
noted, these estimates are based on relatively few observations (only 59 
observations of members of Congress reaching their ninth term on a 
given committee). At the same time, we have little reason to believe 
that the "experience-driven" negative duration dependence should 
persist as the number of terms served gets large. Some of these more 
senior members may shift from committee positions into party lead- 
ership positions, for example. In other cases, very senior members may 
be stripped of their authority by a "changing of the guard" in party 
leadership or in recognition of the member's declining vitality (as the 
member, presumably, enters old age). But these stories all lie outside 
of the main purpose of our model, which is to investigate the systemic 
effects of ballot reforms on tenure. 
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scholarly efforts, however, have sought to provide sys- 
tematic explanations for how the nineteenth-century 
House transformed into the modern House. We have 
proposed a first step toward such an explanation, in 
which we take Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina's emphasis 
on the electoral connection to heart. 
We have argued that most of the widely accepted 
models of the modern Congress begin with the reelec- 
tion incentive and that this incentive itself reflects the 
formal structure of the electoral rules chosen by the 
states. The point of the reelection incentive assumption 
for understanding Congress, of course, is that member 
motivations in turn affect how members of Congress 
behave within Congress. Holding constant the rules and 
structures employed by the House, we expect members 
of Congress to allocate their limited time and energy 
optimally to secure reelection. The "seniority system" of 
tenure rights to committee assignments fits quite well 
with a reelection-oriented perspective on legislative or- 
ganization. Only a member of Congress who believed he 
could affect his chances of reelection would invest 
heavily in credit-claiming human capital, such as a 
reputation for expertise in a particular policy arena. 
Hence, if the committee assignment process is sensitive 
to such investments, a change in electoral rules that 
raises the average level of investment in expertise should 
produce as well an increase in the average rate of 
reappointment. 
In our view, then, tenure rights for reelection-minded 
members of Congress within a division-of-labor commit- 
tee system makes sense both for members of Congress 
and for their parties. Members trying to get reelected 
will work harder at climbing the learning curve toward 
being experts on policies and policy implementation 
when they believe those skills will continue to serve them 
in future terms of office. Individual committee members 
in the pursuit of credit-claiming opportunities will be 
motivated both to seek out problems and solutions, and 
to publicize their findings. 
We have argued that the development of the modern 
House in the late nineteenth century can best be ac- 
counted for in a model that explicitly considers the 
electoral motives of members of Congress. Congres- 
sional organizations are a matter of choice for incum- 
bent members of Congress; they tend to reflect the 
forces that drive members' interests and incentives. 
Thus, events that alter the value of various electoral 
strategies, such as changes in electoral laws, should have 
predictable effects on House organizations. Australian 
ballot electoral laws at the state level provided the 
necessary conditions for modern, "personal vote" coali- 
tion-building activities in the House. 
APPENDIX 
We shall derive in some detail the statistical model used to test 
our claims about changes in committee tenure patterns dis- 
cussed in the text.20 Since hazard models are not so commonly 
used in political science, we first show the relationship between 
20 The discussion in the appendix is based on Sueyoshi 1991 and Kiefer 
1988, which provide greater detail. 
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the hazard function and the distribution of duration times, 
which is normally used to generate a maximum likelihood 
model. We then use the hazard model to generate a likelihood 
function and show how the hazard model specified can be 
thought of as an unusual binary choice model, which aides in 
both estimation and interpretation. Finally, we turn to speci- 
fying the functional form of the hazard model in the text. 
Our goal is to develop a statistical model of how long a 
member of Congress remains on a committee, taking into 
account possible right-censoring due to failure to be returned 
to Congress. Using standard econometric practice we would 
just specify either the conditional density f(ttXO) or distribu- 
tion F(tIX,0) and maximize the resulting likelihood function. 
However, it is often easier with grouped duration data such as 
the committee tenure data to specify instead the hazard 
rate-that is, the probability that an individual in the sample 
gives up his assignment in period t. We are able to specify the 
model in terms of the hazard rate because it completely 
determines the stochastic process. 
We define the hazard function, ignoring covariates for the 
moment, as 
A(t) =l f(t) f(t) (A-1) 1 - F(t) S(t)'(Ai 
where F(t) is the cumulative distribution of the durations, f(t) 
is its associated density, and S(t) is the survivor function-that 
is, the probability that the duration T is greater than t. Since 
f(t) =F'(t), equation A-1 sets up an implicit differential equa- 
tion that we can use to solve for S(t): 
rt 
S(t) = exp -I (s)ds (A-2) 
We therefore see that the density (and, of course, the cumu- 
lative distribution) can be expressed entirely in terms of the 
hazard function X(t) from equations A-1 and A-2: 
rt\ 
f(t) = X(t)S(t) = X(t)exp -f X(s)ds (A-3) 
This implies that we can write the likelihood using the hazard 
function. 
Before we can derive the likelihood function, we need to 
provide some more definitions and notation. We will first need 
to define f(t) not in terms of S(t) but instead in terms of the 
conditional survival function. Consider any two durations tk 
and tk1 ordered by their subscripts (tk_1 < tk). We may define 
the conditional survivor function as 
S(tk I T> tk-l) = Pr(T 2 tkl T > tk-1) 
rtk\ 
= exp - f (s)ds). 
Then 
k 
f(tk) - X(tk)HS(tjIT> tj_1), 
j=1 
k 
because S(tk) = H S(tj IT > tj11); to = 0. 
j=1 
We also need to extend the basic notation and results to the 
more general hazard function A(t, X, 0), which allows for a 
parameterized influence of a set of covariates X given a set of 
parameters 0. Using this new notation we can redefine the 
conditional survivor function as 
t k 
S(tk, X, 1IT> tk-l) = xk(X, 0) = exp - X(s)ds (A-4) 
where Otk(X, 0) represents the exponential of the kth integrated 
hazard segment from tk-1 to tk. 
Turning to the problem of formulating the likelihood func- 
tion, two possible cases will arise in the data. In the case where 
the failure time is not right-censored and is observed to occur 
at period t, all that is known is that the individual had not failed 
(i.e., left the committee) at the beginning of period t - 1 but 
has failed by the beginning of period t. Alternatively, given 
right-censoring at period t, all that is known is that the 
underlying duration exceeds t - 1. The probabilities associated 
with these two events (and hence their contribution to the 
likelihood) can be expressed in terms of the underlying hazards 
and integrated hazard segments: 
tk 
Pr(tkl I T ? tk) = f X(s, X, 0)S(s, X, 0)ds 
tk- I 
k-i 
= (1 - Ok(X,0)) 17 Otj(X, 0) 
j=1 
Pr(T ? t 1) = f X(s, X, 0)S(s, X, 0)ds 
tk-1 
= 171 t(X, 0). 
j=i 
Given these two probabilities, we are in a position to define 
the likelihood function for the grouped duration data. If 
individual i's duration takes the from (ti, ci), where t1 is the 
individual observed duration and ci is a censoring indicator 
that takes on the value of one if the observation is censored 
and zero otherwise, then the likelihood function for the N 
individuals in the sample is 
N ti-1 
L(0) = O - cti(xi, 0))-Ci J 1(Xi, 0)8) (A-5) 
i=, j=, 
The common approach to estimation then would be to specify 
a functional form for X(Q) (and therefore o( )) and maximize 
the log likelihood function given the observed data. We will 
come back to the choice of functional form for the hazard 
function. 
In order to simplify the estimation of equation A-5, we need 
to consider the relationship of hazard models to other discrete 
choice models. We can think of an individual observation as 
a series of binary choices in each period: Individual i either 
survived or failed in each period. In terms of the likelihood 
function in equation A-5, each individual contributes t, - c 
nonidentical Bernoulli trials to the likelihood, where the 
success probabilities are given by a period-specific function for 
the probability of surviving to the subsequent period (Kiefer 
1988). 
In order to estimate the durations on committees as a series 
of binary choices, we need to construct a synthetic data set, 
with each period-individual survival as the unit of observation. 
Let the total number of observations in this synthetic data set 
be N~ = E (t1-c,). We index these observations by n, define 
the indicator dn, which takes on the value of one if the 
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individual survives the interval and zero otherwise, and the 
time indicator t,, which gives the time period with the interval 
associated with observation n. We can then write the equiva- 
lent likelihood function: 
N 
L ( O ) = 171 Of(Xx 0)dn(l - 0, (X, 0))1-dn (A-6) 
n=1 
This likelihood is strikingly similar to the standard binary 
choice models, except that the usual cumulative distribution 
(either the normal for probit or logistic for logit models) is 
replaced by t(), which depends on the integrated hazard 
components. 
The only issue left to resolve in order to estimate the model 
is a specification of X(t, X, 0). We choose to restrict our 
specification to the family of Cox (1972) proportional hazards 
defined as 
X(t, X, 0) = XO(t) exp (XG), 
where XO(t) is the baseline hazard that characterizes the de- 
pendence of the hazard upon time, which may depend on 
additional parameters, so that 0 contains both 0 and the 
additional shape parameters. The specification derives its 
name from the fact that the explanatory variables alter the 
hazard proportionately, by scaling the baseline hazard up or 
down by a constant factor. 
Although we have specified X(-), our likelihood is written in 
terms of the otk; so we must derive it. We do this by substituting 
our choice of X(-) into the definition of otk. This yields 
tk 
Otk(X, 0) = exp -J Xo(s) exp (Xr)ds 
= exp(-exp(-yk + XG)), (A-7) 
where 
rtk 
AYk= logf Xo(s)ds. 
tk-1 
Hence, the yk embeds the nature of the duration dependence 
of the process. 
Much of the econometric literature on proportional hazards 
has focused on specifying a parametric functional form for 
XO(t), which places between-period restrictions on the Yk. In 
our case, because we have no theoretical justification for 
restriction on the duration dependence, we estimate the -Yk'S 
directly as period-specific constants-an approach referred to 
as semiparametric in the literature. We can thus estimate our 
model using a binary response model in which the probability 
of surviving an interval is given by exp(-exp(-yk+XP)). 
There are two advantages to likelihood function defined by 
equations A-6 and A-7. First, we do not need to restrict the 
duration dependence as is required by the parametric ap- 
proaches. This is important in our application because, as 
noted, we have no theoretical basis upon which to place such 
restrictions. Second-and more important-this binary choice 
model of the duration is straightforward to compute. All that is 
needed to evaluate the likelihood is the ability to estimate 
nonlinear regression models. We estimated our model by first 
estimating the appropriate nonlinear regression using fixed 
weights. We then used these estimates as initial values to take 
one Newton-Raphson step in the direction of maximum like- 
lihood.21 This one-step estimator will achieve first-order effi- 
21 SAS code for this procedure is available upon request from the 
authors. 
32 
ciency and will offer considerable computational saving over a 
fully interactive estimation of equation A-5. 
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